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Abstract—The Automatic Identification System (AIS) was 
initially designed for safety and security of navigation purposes. 
However it was progressively also used for other objectives, such 
as surveillance, and thus led to the discovery of behaviors such as 
the falsification of the AIS messages by people that have been 
carrying out illegal activities and will to keep their activities up in 
an hidden way. In addition, the messages contain erroneous data 
and undergo spoofing attacks. The paper introduces the quality 
dimensions of data that shall be used in a quality assessment of 
AIS messages, in order to point out the dubious ones. The 
principles of a methodological approach for the detection of such 
data errors and falsifications are introduced. 
Keywords—Automatic Identification System; maritime domain 
awareness; data falsification; data quality dimensions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Besides its primordial role in the development of 
ecosystems, its wildlife richness and being one of the last 
places on Earth mainly unknown to humankind, the World 
Ocean is an important place in the economy of the world, as 
some activities, such as transportation of goods, fishing, sailing 
and cruising occur at sea and impact (in a more or less 
important way) the worldwide economy. For instance, 90% of 
global goods transportation and energy transportation are done 
by sea, and millions of people work on sea-related activities 
(fishermen, aquatic farmers, crews on board, workers on 
shore). The shipping areas are more and more crowded due to 
the even increasing traffic [1], leading to risks in coastal areas, 
harbors, and densely exploited maritime roads, as all vessels 
try to optimize their journey, creating conflicts in areas where a 
large amount of vessels are gathered. 
Rules of navigation were put in place in order to reduce the 
number of collisions at sea, that endanger the workers and the 
passengers and can possibly be dangerous for the environment, 
the economy and cause important money losses for companies 
involved in such accidents. 
Some states put in place surveillance systems when they 
had the will to improve the security and safety of the 
navigation off their coasts, in order to point out some 
hazardous areas and suspicious ships which could have some 
illegal interests, and enhance the maritime domain awareness. 
One of those system is the Automatic Identification System 
(AIS), which transmits messages to other vessels (that are 
fitted out) and to shore-based stations, using dedicated radio 
channels in the VHF band. The messages are broadcasted in a 
non-secured channel, so it is possible to gather them, as 
harbors, Vessel Traffic Services (VTSs) and Internet dedicated 
websites (such as marinetraffic.com) do. 
Several systems exist alongside with AIS, such as radar or 
LRIT (Long-Range Identification and Tracking), and all are 
meant to be complementary. For instance, AIS has, with 
respect to radar, a wider range of detection, and enables the 
user to get rid of masks potentially created by the land in 
coastal areas. However, the AIS system remains used at the 
crew’s discretion, as the signal is sent by a dedicated device 
on-board the vessel. Moreover, the messages can be falsified, 
errors can be committed when the user fills in information and 
the message can be spoofed. The fact to process the data in a 
mathematical way could bring some information on the 
integrity and reliability of data, by the computation of a 
message-based coefficient, which would rate information. This 
is done because people, on board the vessels or in VTSs take 
decision on the basis of the available information they have. So 
in this scope of decision-making situations, the knowledge of 
the quality of the information they handle is of paramount 
importance. 
II. THE AIS SYSTEM AND ITS WEAKNESSES 
A. The Automatic Identification System 
1) Genesis and concerned vessels: The Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) was put in place by the Safety Of 
Life At Sea (SOLAS) convention, in its 2002 version [2]. This 
convention, initiated in 1914 by the sinking of the RMS 
Titanic two years beforehand, has the purpose of defining the 
minimal requirements to which every vessel from signatory 
countries should comply with. The SOLAS convention deals 
with a lot of subjects, ranging from the construction of vessels 
to the way radio-communications shall be done. 
One of those subjects is the security and safety of maritime 
navigation, and the AIS system was created in this scope, in 
order to provide real-time spatiotemporal positioning of a 
vessel to the other vessels and to shore stations located in its 
radio range of action (so no further the radio horizon). 
Some ships from the signatory countries are concerned by 
this regulation. Indeed, the SOLAS convention, in its fifth 
chapter, nineteenth rule, paragraph 2.4, states that “All ships 
of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international 
voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards 
not engaged on international voyages and passenger ships 
irrespective of size shall be fitted with an automatic 
identification system” [2]. The deadline for a vessel to be 
equipped depends on its type and range from 2002 for new 
ships to the 2008 for non-international travelers vessels. 
2) The transmission mode of AIS: The 
transmission of AIS is done in the Very High Frequency 
(VHF) bandwidth (which ranges from 30 to 400 MHz), and 
more precisely in the dedicated Marine VHF bandwidth 
(consisting in four distinct bandwidth which have a total range 
of 2.225MHz), as VHF band is split in sub-bands which are 
used for specific and various applications, such as search and 
rescue, private or military applications, radio-astronomy, 
amongst others. Two worldwide dedicated wavelengths are 
used to transmit AIS data : 161.975MHz and 162.025MHz. In 
order to transmit and receive AIS signals, some dedicated 
devices have been put in place since the introduction of the 
system. Four kinds of devices can be distinguished: class A 
transponders, class B transponders, multi-channel receivers 
and radio scanner receivers. 
One of those subjects is the security and safety of maritime 
navigation, and the AIS system was created in this scope, in 
order to provide real-time spatiotemporal positioning of a 
vessel to the other vessels and to shore stations located in its 
radio range of action (so no further the radio horizon). 
Class A transponders equip all the ships that are legally 
required to use the system by the SOLAS convention. They 
can receive and transmit simultaneously on both channels, and 
have full capability and options for the users. Class B 
transponders equip all the ships that are not legally required to 
use the system but which owners wish to transmit their 
information and receive information from the others. As their 
capabilities and options are reduced, their price is lower. Those 
transponders can receive and transmit on both channels 
simultaneously. Multi-channel receivers and radio scanner 
receivers cannot transmit information but they can receive, 
simultaneously on both channels or only on one channel at a 
time respectively. Those receivers are used by ships wishing to 
improve their situational awareness at sea. 
The AIS transponders must be linked to a GNSS antenna 
for positioning reports, and can be linked to an ECDIS 
(Electronic Charts Display Information System) for the 
visualization of surrounding traffic and improvement of 
maritime situation awareness. 
Today, two types of transmission are available: terrestrial 
(i.e. direct reception from emitting device) and by satellite (i.e. 
the broadcasted signal is received by a dedicated spacecraft). 
However, at first, the system was only terrestrial, with 
transmission occurring from one vessel to another, or between 
a shore station and a vessel, in a range of distance which is 
limited by the curvature of the Earth (circa 40 nautical miles in 
optimal conditions [3]). The development of satellites enabled 
to receive messages even far from the coast line, as it uploads 
and stores the received messages then download information as 
soon a coast line and a shore station is reached. The 
development of Internet gave an even more important step 
forward in the knowledge of maritime situation as websites 
display AIS information from all over the world. So where 
ships previously disappeared beyond the skyline from a 
terrestrial point of view, they can now be tracked in the whole 
world by every person who can access the Internet network. 
3) The various types of messages: Because of the 
fact that communications can be various, 27 types of messages 
were created, each one of them suitable in a particular 
situation. As stated by [4], the most used messages are the 
numbers 1, 3 and 5, that are respectively scheduled, special 
and static position reports for class A transponders. There are 
standard messages (for class A and B transponders, aircrafts 
and satellite transmission for spatiotemporal position report), 
aid-to-navigation messages, safety messages, binary messages, 
among others. Depending on its type, the message can take 
from one to five time slots of transmission [4]. Moreover, the 
position report messages are sent every 2 to 12 seconds, the 
gap between two messages depending on the speed of the 
vessel. The outline of the messages is strictly defined and can 
be found in [5]. According to [3], in a common day, 22 000 
vessels send about 400 000 messages. 
 
4) The emission of the signal: The emission is 
made during time slots, with a length of 26.67ms, each 
message being sent uses between one and five of those time 
slots. There are 2250 of those slots in a minute of time. In 
order to have a scheduled, organized and ordered sending of 
the messages, several protocols were put in place. 
The most of those protocols is the SOTDMA, which stands 
for Self Organized Time Division Multiple Access. This 
protocol enables to manage operations in an automatic way, 
and conceived for sea communication networks. The stations 
(vessels or shore stations) manage their own time slots 
reservations for the subsequent messages, and they can modify 
their own reservations in case of conflict (for instance a 
meeting with a new station). This protocol is used by class A 
transponders. 
5) The content of the messages: Of course, the 
content of a message widely varies according to the type of 
the message, and a position report message will not have the 
same fields as an aid to navigation message has. A position 
report (messages 1, 2 and 3) has such data as the user, the 
navigation status, the rotation rate, the speed, the longitude, 
the latitude, the course, the true heading, among others. An aid 
to navigation message (number 21) would display the type of 
aid, the name of the aid, a longitude, a latitude, a reference 
point, among others, and a message for satellite transmission 
(number 27), has simplified data, such as Maritime Mobile 
Service Identity (MMSI) number, navigation status, speed and 
course as well as message 1, but have simplified longitude and 
latitude, and no other data of interest in order to save place 
and have a simple transmission. 
B. The weaknesses of AIS 
1) The limits of the system: While initially 
designed for security and safety of the navigation purposes 
through the SOLAS convention, this system is used another 
way by some people. Indeed, some additional purposes such 
as investigation in case of accident, traffic in dangerous areas, 
search and rescue, control of fleets (cargo, fishing) and of 
global traffic. In the end, several kind of people can use this 
system, such as coastal authorities for law enforcement, 
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MMRCs) for search 
and rescue operations, mariners on board for their own safety 
of navigation and ship owners for fleet tracking.  
 
2) The errors in the messages: A part of the 
information contained in AIS messages are entered manually 
by the crew, both at the initialization of the system for 
permanent data (such as the name of the vessel for instance) 
and at every new journey for journey-related data (such as the 
destination for instance), some of the pieces of information 
can be erroneous. A study of such erroneous data can be found 
in [6]. They can be done by underestimating the importance of 
a correct fulfillment of the system or by ignorance and, as 
being errors, are not intentional. 
Each human-filled field is subject to errors, as well in 
static data such as identification number of the ship, type of 
the vessel, name of the vessel, the physical characteristics 
(length, beam, draft) that in dynamic data such as the position 
(latitude, longitude), the navigation status, the estimated time 
of arrival or the destination. According to the study of [6], 
both static and dynamic data are subject to errors. 
Thus, the MMSI number is false is an estimated 2% of the 
cases [6]. Four numbers appeared in a regular way: “0”, “1”, 
“999999999” and “1193046”, the latter being guessed as 
being the initialization number of some kind of transponder. 
Also, the type of the vessel is often unclear. As 6% do not 
define a type at all, 3% define their vessel simply as “vessel”. 
The problem of definition is larger, as it lies on the perception 
of the person entering information: a case of three ferries, 
perfectly identical vessels, was shown, were the three given 
types were “High Speed Craft”, “Passenger” and “Cargo” [6]. 
The name of the vessel is another issue, as 0.5% does not have 
a registered name, and some others exceed the allocated space 
in the field, which is 20 characters. 
The position is also subject to problems, as it was noticed that 
circa 1% of ships had a latitude value (in absolute value) 
superior to 90° or a longitude value (in absolute value) 
superior to 180°. The destination is not clearly filled in in 
almost half of the cases. The use of a vague name, of a 
country, of an abbreviation, a black space, or jokes is 
widespread, such as “not available”, “not defined”, “null”, 
“Atlantic ocean”, “to hell” or “anywhere but here”. Physical 
characteristics of vessels also suffer from several lacks of 
consistency [6]. 
3) The falsifications in the messages: The 
falsification of AIS messages consists in the fact to modify the 
message they send, or the fact to stop the transmission of the 
message, in the particular goal to mislead people that could 
receive these messages. 
Identity theft, destination masking and disappearances are 
kinds of falsification. Identity thefts occur when a vessel takes 
the identity (i.e. the MMSi number) of another one. Hundreds 
of vessels are dissimulated this way [7]. As an exemple, Iran 
used to falsify the identity of some vessels in order to trade 
with Syria [8]. Destination masking, when made on purpose, 
is a falsification [7], as it creates a voluntary lack of 
information. As for disappearances, the fact to cut off AIS 
transmission could indicate a will to hide some illegal 
activities, such as trade illegal goods on coast or with other 
ships, or fish in unauthorized areas [9]. One vessel out of four 
cuts off its AIS transponder for at least 10% of the time, taken 
into account the times of lacking GNSS coverage. The fact to 
cut off the transmission is also a way to protect oneself from 
the pirates that could have an Internet access to check the 
vessels they could attack. Moreover, the fact that cutting off 
the AIS is very simple and the physical freedom to do so is let 
to mariners favors this kind of behavior. 
4) The spoofing of messages: The fact to spoof 
messages consists in an action from an actor which is external 
to the vessel, done in order to mislead both the crew on board 
and the outside world (MRCCs for instance) on the behavior 
of a vessel. 
Some of those spoofing behaviors are presented by [10], 
with for instance a false closest point of approach alert. Such 
an alert occurs when two spatiotemporal trajectories of vessel 
are crossing, in order to prevent a boarding. A false alert 
consists of the creation of a ghost vessel that would cross the 
trajectory of another one, forcing the real one to change its 
heading, and could hypothetically be guided to hazardous 
locations. In addition, [10] implemented a program which 
created a ship having a spatiotemporal trajectory which was 
displaying a word in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Another example of spoofing is presented in [11], in which 
a pirate GNSS signal is emitted, with a higher power than the 
genuine one, and covering it. In this case, the system is misled 
on the positioning aspects, it transmits a false message and 
forces the pilot to maneuver to return to the believed right 
cape, but in fact moves away from the initial destination. 
III. THE APPROACH 
As the purpose is to ascertain the vessels from which the 
received messages are false, falsified or spoofed, several 
approaches can be used, such as signal-based or message-
based. This research concentrates on a message-based 
approach, with an interest in inner information that is present 
in the messages. Indeed, messages are made of raw data which 
are, once refined, source of information on all the relevant 
AIS-linked fields of information. It is therefore important to 
handle the characteristics (among them their quality 
dimensions) of data and information in order to assess the 
quality of messages. The quality dimensions and the methods 
used for assessment are meant to change depending on the 
type of message and on the type of study (one message alone 
or a group of messages for instance). 
IV. INFORMATION AND DATA IN AIS MESSAGES 
A. Internal and external quality 
The qualities of a message can be divided in two parts, the 
external quality, which is the quality from the point of view of 
the user and the internal quality, which is the qualities from 
the point of view of the supplier. External quality covers ease 
of use, robustness, openness, reliability, accuracy, conformity 
to the expectations, among others, so external quality can be 
considered as being the fitness for use. Internal quality lies on 
concision, cohesion, clarity, generality and simplicity, among 
others [12]. 
Internal quality can be described by answering the 
question: how can I measure the quality of my data and how 
can I signify it? It is the intrinsic quality of a data set 
established through rules. It is an absolute technical quality. 
External quality can simply be defined as the fitness for 
use, which worth answering the question: what are the needs 
of the user on data quality and information quality and how 
can I give it in order to prevent them from having an abusive 
use of them? External quality is more difficult to assess 
because of the multiple and various needs, and the purpose of 
linking data and their use, data producers’ concerns and users’ 
expectations. External quality is the ability to fulfil a particular 
need, and is a relative use quality. 
In case of AIS messages, the assessment of internal quality 
is important in order to ascertain the genuineness and 
truthfulness of a message, rather than an external quality 
assessment, as it depends on the receiver’s experience, which 
is difficult to ascertain as it vastly varies from one to another. 
B. Some quality dimensions of data 
1) Accuracy: Considering an attribute a of an 
entity e, its standard value is v. The accuracy of a v’ value 
would be the degree of closeness of (v’-a-e) with respect to (v-
a-e). If the value v’ = v, the accuracy is maximal and the value 
is said to be correct. As it is possible to determine accuracy, it 
is also possible to determine inaccuracy, which would be the 
degree of difference between the actual value and the correct 
value. One problem of the determination of accuracy is the 
notion of correct value. Sometimes, the correct value may not 
be defined in a unique way, or it can be undefined. Even when 
a standard value is possible, the calculation of the accuracy 
may not be obvious, for instance with the words, or the binary 
values. Sometimes the determination of accuracy with 
numbers can cause some problems. So the quantification of 
accuracy or inaccuracy of a value is a nontrivial task [13]. 
 
2) Precision: The precision of data does not 
directly refer to data but to the model in which data is 
displayed. It is a measurement of the degree of detail of the 
classification of possible values for data. For instance, when a 
temperature is measured, is the value rounded at the unit level, 
or at the one-tenth of degree level; or when a height is 
measured, it is using feet or inches; or when a color scale is 
used, does this scale have 16 or 256 possible values. 
 
3) Reliability: The reliability of data in a database 
is defined in [14] as “a measure of the extent to which a 
database can be expected to exhibit the externally-observable 
structural properties specified for a database”. It is the process 
of validation that leads to reliability, i.e. the checking that the 
values in the base obey to the rules defined in the outline. It is 
a measure of robustness, which is the assessment of absence 
of system failures. 
 
4) Currentness: This term is used as defined by 
[13]. As for the currentness, a datum, by its nature, represents 
a value at a given time. As most objects evolve with time, the 
value can evolve as well. A datum true at a given time t is 
either up-to-date or out-of-date at another time t’. The change 
over time of a value creates inaccuracy in data, and the notion 
of currentness can measure the degree of how far out-to-date 
the datum is [13]. This property can be expended to an entire 
database for the measurement of its currentness. False data is 
neither up-to-date nor out-of-date. A distinction must be done 
between data evolving by nature (such as the speed of the 
vessel), data likely to evolve (the navigation status), data that 
may change (such as the usual geographical area of 
navigation), data unlikely to change (the name of the vessel) 
and permanent data (the length or draught of a vessel). Given 
the age of a datum, the probability for it to remain up-to-date 
after a certain time will depend on which category it belongs, 
among other parameters. 
 
5) Completeness: The completeness of a database 
represents the proportion of triplets where a value which is 
supposed to exist is actually filled in. It can be seen in a binary 
mode, i.e. yes if every single possible value is filled in and no 
otherwise; or in a measure of completeness by measuring the 
fraction of filled in fields with respect to the highest possible 
number of filled in fields [13]. In databases, a special element 
called null is used when an attribute in non-applicable (for 
instance the destination when a ship is docked), when the 
attribute is of unknown applicability (the relevance of the 
destination field requires the navigational status field to be 
filled in), or when the attribute is applicable but the value 
unknown (for instance the navigational status, always 
applicable). Completeness is linked to the fact for a database 
to contain all the relevant data [15] for a given use. The 
duplication is the fact, for a database, to have identical triplets, 
or to have triplet with the same entity and attribute, but 
different values [13]. Some of those triplets can be irrelevant. 
The proportion of duplicate values can be measured as a 
characteristic of the database. 
 
6) Consistency: In a database, the values of the 
different terms must agree. The consistency is part of this 
agreement. A consistent database should have consistent 
values within, as well as unnecessary null values should be 
avoided. The consistency of the database can be measured in a 
binary yes/no mode, and the database will be consistent is all 
the constraints are fulfilled. A measure of the consistency can 
also be done by the measure of the fraction of consistent 
triplets in the database. The development of data dictionaries 
is one part of the consistency improvement, helping to the 
creation of translation rules between different representations 
of the same data or of closely linked data [15]. 
 
7) Integrity: A measurement of integrity can be 
done considering all the previous qualities, and empowering 
the measure of consistency by the use of the temporal 
dimension, which involves the recording of insertions, 
deletions and modifications of items. 
 
C. A measure of coherence in information 
A common definition of coherence is presented in [16] as 
“when we gather information from less than fully reliable 
sources, then the more coherent the story that materializes is, 
the more confident we may be, ceteris paribus”. Some factors 
can affect the confidence we have in a piece of information. 
Three can be distinguished: how surprising is the information, 
how reliable are the sources and how coherent is the 
information [16]. For instance, if pieces of information are 
both halfway surprising and halfway coherent, the global 
confidence will rely on the reliability of the sources: we will 
be more likely to increase our degree of confidence as the 
source is more referenced as truth-teller rather than 
randomizer. Similarly, if the pieces of information are halfway 
coherent and come from halfway reliable sources, we will rely 
on the surprise factor in order to assess the degree of 
confidence, which will be as high as the piece of information 
is more rather than less expected. 
 
In the case of AIS messages, there are a lot of sources, 
both vessels and shore-based stations, with a wide spectrum of 
types of messages, where some message can be of confidence 
but with a low quality. An ascertainment of the confidence in 
individuals messages could be done sorting data by MMSI 
number (i.e. by user). 
D. The quality dimensions in the case of AIS messages 
 
In the following table I, comparisons are made between 
relevant information and data quality dimensions and their 
application in the case of AIS messages. 
TABLE I.  APPLICATION OF QUALITY DIMENSIONS 
 
Quality 
dimension 
Application of the dimension 
Accuracy 
Definition of standard values, for instance 
in the case of the speed of vessels 
Precision 
Definition of latitude and longitude, as seen 
above 
Reliability 
General coherence of messages with 
respect to ITU recommendations 
Currentness Use of time stamps of messages 
Completeness 
Definition of all the fields that should be 
filled in depending on the message, then 
computation of their ratio 
Consistency 
Coherence of information within a message 
or between messages 
Integrity 
Enhancement of consistency with temporal 
recording of actions 
 
 
V. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
A. Hypotheses 
In this environment, a hypothesis could consist in being 
able to ascertain the trust in a message by analyzing its data 
through the scope of the quality of its inner information. At 
several levels, such an assessment could be done using the 
data within and by processing it. As the AIS system is not 
reliable and used by many people for various purposes, the 
awareness of the users on the proper nature of the system shall 
be clear. 
The integrity of data must be investigated, as some 
information is clearly impossible (out framed GNSS 
coordinates for instance) or physically incompatible (two 
vessels with the same number at the same time, a speed that 
does not match with the type of the vessel). Such a 
determination of the reliability of information can be done 
using a scale of belief, disbelief and uncertainty based on a 
statistical study [17]. 
The trust in a user will depend on the past behavior of this 
user, as the opinion about the source is a key part of trust [18]. 
This part is mainly made by VTSs and harbors, with the 
blacklisting of suspicious vessels. The users themselves can be 
various, with various degree of a priori confidence (between a 
fisherman and a MRCC member for instance). 
B. Exemplification of the methodology on a message 
As the purpose is to detect vessels that are undergoing 
attacks or that are emitting false messages on purpose, a 
means for the assessment of such vessels must be developed. 
As information comes from messages, it is possible to treat 
and analyze every message independently from the others, a 
group of messages as a whole, or a single message with 
respect to a group of messages. 
Data contained in AIS message are various, and the 
messages themselves are numerous. Such an analysis would 
bring a numerical value on a message, a group of messages or 
a message with respect to a group of messages. 
TABLE II.  AN AIS MESSAGE NUMBER 1 
 
For instance, a message number 1 contains, according to 
[5], the information contained in table II. Message number 1 is 
a position report message, sent in a case of scheduled position 
report by a class A transponder. This message follows the 
exact same scheme as messages number 2 and 3, used 
respectively for assigned scheduled position report for class A 
transponders and special position report as a response to 
interrogation by a class A transponder. 
Several assessments can be done in the only message 1 
case. The accuracy can be partly judged by the 01G field, 
while the precision assessment will concentrate on fields such 
as 01H and 01I for position, but also 01F, 01E, 01J and 01K 
for current attitude. The reliability will be assessed by the 
comparison of the values in the message with reasonably 
possible values. This will ensure the proper reception of the 
right message. 
The currentness of the message shall be determined using 
01L field, while consistency and integrity will be assessed by 
the studies of the fields independently and with respect to one 
another, e.g. besides saying that 01H and 01I fields actually 
correspond to possible coordinates, comparing them in a 
spatiotemporal way with 01D, 01E, 01F, 01J, 01K and 01L to 
ensure that the behavior is coherent.  
Inspired by the Information Theory developed by Shannon 
in [19], a mathematical processing of data can be done in 
order to assess the usefulness of a message, its reliability and 
its integrity. 
The integrity of data is of major importance, and can be 
assessed for a single message (integrity of the information 
within), for a group of messages (integrity between the data 
between the messages) and for a message with respect to a 
group of messages. 
A coefficient for data integrity could then be computed, 
and with a specified threshold, detect the dubious messages on 
the basis of data quality, with many parameters taken into 
account, at several levels: internal to the system, a single 
message, a group of messages, or external to the system. Such 
a coefficient would be an indicator for data quality 
assessment. 
The assessment of a single message would be the integrity 
of the data that can be found in the coherence of its inner 
information, the coherence of a message from a ship can be 
assessed by comparison with all the other messages sent 
beforehand by the same vessel, or by different vessels 
following the same path. The fact to receive or not to receive 
an expected message would give additional information on the 
reliability of the system. 
However, such an assessment needs the definition of 
several metrics for the measure of distances, which would be 
specific to each field. This will be the purpose of future work. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduces issues on AIS and the way to use 
information and data quality dimensions to assess the 
truthfulness and the genuineness in a message, as various 
problems of errors, falsification and spoofing of the messages 
actually occur. In this scope, such an assessment of data 
quality using accuracy, precision, reliability, currentness, 
completeness, consistency and particularly integrity would 
bring the detection of erroneous, false or spoofed messages 
easier, and therefore enhance the maritime situational 
awareness of maritime actors, and thus security and safety at 
sea.  
Having an importance in the field of geospatial 
technology, visualization and kinematic studies can lead to 
kinematic analyses, and thus in behavioral analysis, by 
comparing several kinds of nominal behaviors. As a 
Field 
indicator 
 
N° of 
bits 
Field name 
01A 6 Message ID 
01B 2 Repeat indicator 
01C 30 User ID 
01D 4 Navigational status 
01E 8 Rate of turn 
01F 10 Speed over ground 
01G 1 Position accuracy 
01H 28 Longitude 
01I 27 Latitude 
01J 12 Course over ground 
01K 9 True heading 
01L 6 Time stamp 
01M 2 Special maneuver indicator 
01N 3 Spare 
01O 1 RAIM-flag 
01P 19 Communication state 
specialization of the information theory in the field of 
geomatics sciences, future work will concentrate on the use of 
geographical data, as well as on kinematic considerations (i.e. 
comparisons between foreseen behavior with respect with 
broadcasted message data and actual behavior) and behavioral 
analysis (i.e. use of external databases such as weather 
information to enlighten and characterize behaviors). 
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